종업원의 지분소유와 노동투자효율성

Employee Stock Ownership and Labor Investment Efficiency

초록

This study examines the impact of employee ownership on labor investment efficiency, exploring whether employee ownership addresses the agency problem between managers and shareholders and employees’ retention motivation. We conjecture that employee ownership can effectively monitor management, leading to an increase in labor investment efficiency. Additionally, employee ownership increases the trust between employees and managers and lower the adjustment cost, which enhances labor investment efficiency. Using a sample of listed firms from 2012 to 2022, the results show a positive relationship between employee ownership and labor investment efficiency. The results are observed only for overinvestment, while no significant effect is found for underinvestment. Additional tests based on human capital intensity show labor investment efficiency improves only in firms with high intensity but no significant effect found in firms with low intensity. These findings suggest that employee ownership enhances labor investment efficiency by reducing the overinvestment in labor, suggesting the role of employee shareholders as an effective governance mechanism. The study provides empirical evidence supporting the positive role of employee shareholders. In particular, the findings regarding the influence of employee ownership on firm operations explain the positive views about employees share ownership in the capital market.

키워드

Employee Stock OwnershipLabor Investment EfficiencyAgency CostManager- Employee RelationshipHuman Capital Intensity
제목
종업원의 지분소유와 노동투자효율성
제목 (타언어)
Employee Stock Ownership and Labor Investment Efficiency
저자
신혜정김수인
발행일
2025-08
유형
Y
저널명
동아시아경영연구
6
2
페이지
49 ~ 76